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Abstract 
 
Although cooperation is central to the organisation of many social systems, relatively little is 
known about cooperation in situations of collective emergency. When groups of people flee 
from a danger such as a burning building or a terrorist attack, the collective benefit of 
cooperation is important, but the cost of helping is high and the temptation to defect is 
strong. To explore the degree of cooperation in emergencies, we develop a new social 
game, the help-or-escape social dilemma. Under time and monetary pressure, players 
decide how much risk they are willing to take in order to help others.  
Results indicated that players took as much risk to help others during emergencies as they 
did under normal conditions. In both conditions, most players applied an egalitarian heuristic 
and helped others until their chance of success equalled that of the group. This strategy is 
less efficient during emergencies, however, because the increased time pressure results in 
fewer people helped. Furthermore, emergencies tend to amplify participants’ initial tendency 
to cooperate, with prosocials becoming even more cooperative and individualists becoming 
even more selfish. Our framework offers new opportunities to study human cooperation and 
could help authorities to better manage crowd behaviours during mass emergencies. 
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Introduction 
 
 
Mass evacuations in stressful emergency situations are extraordinary events during which 
people’s behaviour is difficult to anticipate1. Recent examples include terrorist attacks in 
crowded urban areas (e.g. in Paris in 2015), crowd disasters during mass gatherings (e.g at 
the Mecca in 2015), and collective evacuations after natural disasters (e.g. the Ecuador 
earthquake in 2016). Understanding how people react when their lives are at stake is central 
to anticipating the collective behaviour of the crowd and helping authorities to manage such 
critical situations efficiently 2. 
Numerous empirical analyses have been conducted after major incidents such as the 9/11 
attacks3, the Love Parade disaster4, the crowd stampede at the Mecca pilgrimage5,6, and 
several fire evacuations7–9. These studies have highlighted the role of various environmental, 
cognitive and social factors in facilitating or hindering mass evacuations, such as how the 
nature of the fire alarm affects people’s reaction time, the preference for using familiar routes 
during egress, and the importance of social identification between individuals. Other 
experimental studies have demonstrated that people’s risk perceptions are subject to social 
contagion, which can lead to the collective amplification or underestimation of the danger, 
potentially causing critical evacuation delays8,10,11. 
Cooperation in stressful emergency situations is known to have important collective benefits:  
First, cooperation reduces the frequency of pushing and competitive behaviours12, typically 
associated with flow disturbances around exit doors13,14. Second, cooperative individuals can 
help people who have fallen in a rushing crowd back to their feet12, thus reducing the risk of 
stampedes and avoiding the obstructions caused by the bodies on the ground4,13. Third, 
collective solidarity can mitigate fear and negative emotions, thus reducing the risk of panic. 
Fourth, individuals sharing their private routing information can help others find their way out 
and avoid detrimental herding patterns towards dead ends or unusable doors15.  
However, the extent to which people behave altruistically in emergency situations remains 
unclear. Early research indicates that people’s behaviour under emergency conditions is 
rather egoistic. For example, the mass panic approach describes individuals as acting in a 
purely selfish manner16,17, and Mintz’s seminal experiment suggests that individual’s cost-
benefits calculations lead to jams at bottlenecks and inefficient evacuations18. In contrast, 
surveys conducted among emergency survivors point to a high level of cooperation within 
groups of individuals facing a deadly threat19. Furthermore, laboratory experiments and 
empirical analyses of real emergencies have shown that solidarity is increased when there is 
a strong feeling of social identification between individuals5,12,20. A recent virtual evacuation 
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experiment showed that a considerable proportion of participants tend to behave altruistically 
during emergencies, but that proportion diminishes as the cost of helping increases21.  
Thus, the literature on mass evacuations does not paint a clear picture of how much 
cooperation can be expected during emergencies and which social and environmental 
factors promote solidarity within the group. However, collective emergencies share 
characteristics with social dilemmas, on which there is an extensive literature. Social 
dilemmas are defined as situations where individual and collective interests yield opposed 
behaviours: the whole group is better off if each individual cooperates, but each individual 
has more gain from defecting22,23. Research on social dilemmas and human cooperation 
more generally suggests opposing hypotheses with regard to collective emergencies. On the 
one hand, the social heuristic hypothesis suggests that fast and intuitive decisions made 
under time pressure promote cooperation, in contrast to calculated behaviours deriving from 
an internal deliberation process22,24. The severe time pressure typical of emergency 
situations should thus boost solidarity and prosocial behaviours within a crowd. On the other 
hand, emergency situations are characterized by the nature of the underlying reward 
structure, which is, by definition, in the loss domain25: In situations of life and death, people 
compete to avoid an important loss – that of their life, health, or valuable possessions. 
Escaping safely does not provide any extra bonus. According to the prospect theory, people 
are generally loss averse26 and should have a stronger urge to escape, and therefore a 
smaller tendency to help others when their lives are at stake. In line with this assumption, 
Mather and Lighthall have demonstrated that stress leads to a reduction in the choice of 
negative outcomes27. But prospect theory does not take the influence of time pressure and 
the involvement of other people into account, and the social heuristic hypothesis makes no 
exact claim about the influence of losses or gains.  
The challenge of understanding cooperation under emergencies is that multiple, co-
occurring factors could have opposing effects. A simple experimental and conceptual 
framework is therefore needed to explore cooperation in emergencies in detail, in the same 
way as economic games have helped researchers to explore other social dilemmas28.  
For ethical reasons, it is clearly not possible to expose subjects to actual emergency 
situations in the laboratory. However creating conditions that closely mimic important 
aspects of emergency situations is conceivable. To this end, we have designed a new social 
game called the help-or-escape social dilemma, which reproduces the core features of 
collective emergencies. In the next sections, we formally describe this framework and 
present first experimental results describing how experimental subjects behave in it. We 
show that individual levels of cooperation in the game are in line with other standardized 
measures of altruism. Our findings indicate that participants react differently to increased 
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pressure, with prosocial players tending to show increased cooperation during emergencies 
and individualists tending to become even more selfish. 
 
The “Help-or-Escape” Game 
 
The help-or-escape (HoE) game is a conceptual and experimental framework designed to 
mimic the social dilemmas that typically occur during collective emergency situations. The 
game puts subjects in a situation where they have to decide how much risk they are willing 
to take in order to help other participants. 
The HoE game operates under time pressure. That is, the outcome of the game depends not 
only on the subject’s decisions, but also on the timing of those decisions. In each instance of 
the game, the subject has a probability 𝑝(𝑡) of receiving a bonus 𝛼 ≥ 0 and the 
complementary probability (1 − 𝑝(𝑡)) of receiving a penalty 𝛽 ≤ 0. The bonus 𝛼 represents 
the gain associated with success (i.e., managing to escape), whereas the penalty 𝛽 
represents the cost associated with failure (i.e., not managing to escape). The probability 𝑝(𝑡) is time dependent with 𝑝(0) = 1 and 𝑝(𝜏) = 0, where 𝜏 is the duration of the game. 
Assuming that 𝑝(𝑡) decreases linearly with time, we have the probability decay 𝛾 = 1/𝜏 per 
unit of time, and thus 𝑝(𝑡) = 1 − 𝛾𝑡, for t ranging from 0 to 𝜏. 
At any moment, the subject can decide to end the game and leave the setting (i.e., to 
escape). From the time 𝑡 when that decision was made, we derive the probability 𝑝(𝑡), which 
is then used to determine whether the subject receives the bonus 𝛼 (i.e., success) or the 
penalty 𝛽 (i.e., failure).  
The above design describes a simple environment with time pressure: An immediate 
decision to leave the setting almost guarantees success, whereas a late decision has a 
higher chance of failure. Time pressure can be easily manipulated by varying the total time 𝜏; whereas the values of 𝛼 and 𝛽 enable a control of the risk magnitude. For example, a 
large value of 𝜏, 𝛼 > 0 and 𝛽 = 0 describes an environment with little time pressure, where 
the individual is rewarded for success and does not risk any penalty in case of failure. An 
emergency situation, in contrast, would be best described by a small value of 𝜏, 𝛼 = 0 and 𝛽 < 0, where time pressure is strong and the subject seeks only to avoid a loss. 
In the absence of any other constraints, subjects would immediately leave the setting at 𝑡 = 0, maximizing their chance of success. The social dilemma arises from the presence of 
other individuals whom the focal subject can decide to help before leaving the setting. The 
social environment is composed of N other players who have a fixed low probability 𝑝! of 
succeeding and receiving the bonus 𝛼, and a fixed high probability (1 − 𝑝!) of failing and 
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receiving the penalty 𝛽. These participants are passive players: they make no decisions and 
can only wait and hope to be helped by the focal subject. They represent individuals in need 
whom the focal subject meets during the escape, such as injured people asking for help 
during a fire evacuation. At any moment before leaving the setting, the focal subject can 
decide to help one of these participants. The success probability 𝑝! of that person being 
helped is then increased to 𝑝′!. The probabilities 𝑝! and 𝑝′! are game parameters, with 𝑝′! > 𝑝!. The act of helping costs time, however, and therefore reduces the helper’s 
chances of success. In our game, the decision to help another person disables all other 
possible actions during the helping time (i.e. the subject cannot leave the setting or help 
another person), which corresponds to the loss of 𝑝! chances to escape successfully. 
Therefore, the focal subject can offer another person a higher success chance of success at 
the expense of his or her own chance to escape. Once the helping time is over, the subject 
is free to leave the setting or to help another person. Because the available time decreases 
continuously, hesitations and thinking delays also reduce the subject’s chances of success. 
The game ends once the subject decides to leave the setting or when the total time 𝜏 is over. 
At the end of the game, the focal subject and the N other players have success probabilities 
that depend on the sequence of decisions made by the focal subject, from which every 
participant’s gain or penalty can be determined. 
The game enables various factors possibly influencing cooperation to be evaluated, such as 
time pressure, risk magnitude, the number of people in need, the utility of the help provided, 
and the cost of helping. Table 1 summarises the parameters of the game. Note that helping 
others is not rewarded in the game: the decision to help can thus arise only from altruistic 
motivations. This framework describes the structure of a variety of situations with different 
levels of emergency. In the next section, we present two situations with distinct levels of 
emergency, and experimentally test subjects in them. 
 
Experimental procedure 
 
In order to feed our conceptual framework with empirical data, we implemented two distinct 
environments and experimentally tested a total of 104 participants in both environments. In 
the baseline condition, we tested how much help was given by the focal subject in a situation 
of low emergency; in the emergency condition, we tested the same subjects in a situation of 
high emergency. A third, intermediate condition was also implemented but the results were 
identical to those of the baseline condition and are thus not reported in the present article 
(see the Supplementary Information for the results of this intermediate condition). 
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In each condition, we exposed subjects to an introductory framing story to establish a clear 
reference to reality. The baseline condition described an everyday life situation with little time 
pressure and only minor consequences in case of success or failure. Specifically, we asked 
subjects to imagine the following scenario: They are at a train station and want to catch a 
certain train. On their way to the platform they meet other individuals who need their help 
finding their own train. If the subjects decide to help one or more of the individuals in need, 
their own chances of catching their train decrease, whereas the chances of individuals they 
have helped increase. To emphasize that it was a low-stress situation, we told subjects that 
they had arrived early at the train station and informed about the route to their platform. 
There was therefore no major emergency involved. We set 𝜏 = 60 seconds, 𝛼 = 1 euro, and 𝛽 = 0. Therefore, the risk involved is defined in the gain domain, that is, subjects are trying 
to receive a bonus, with no penalty in case of failure25.  
The emergency condition, in contrast, involved severe time pressure and major 
consequences in case of failure. Specifically, we asked subjects to imagine the following: 
They are at a train station and an explosion occurs, causing parts of the building to come 
crashing down. They need to leave the building as soon as possible. As in the baseline 
condition, they meet other individuals in need on their way out. Helping decreases their own 
chances of making it out of the building on time, but increases the chances of the people 
they helped to avoid an important loss. To emphasize that it was a high-stress situation, we 
told subjects that they did not know which routes were still passable. The major emergency 
was represented by the parameters 𝜏 = 15 seconds, 𝛼 = 0, and 𝛽 = −4 euros. Unlike the 
baseline condition, the risk here is defined in the loss domain, that is, subjects are trying 
avoid an important loss, with no monetary bonus in case of success 25. 
For both conditions, we set the other parameters to 𝑁 = 8, 𝑝! = 0.1, 𝑝′! = 0.6, and 𝑝! = 0.1. 
We choose 𝑁 = 8 to give the subject a chance to help all people in need, which would cost 
8x𝑝!, that is, 80% of their chance of success plus some response time. The values of 𝑝! and 𝑝′! indicate that the chance of success of people who receive help increases from 10% to 
60%. We chose 10% to clarify that there was a chance that the person would be fine without 
help, but that it was very low. We chose 60% to indicate that, with help, a positive outcome 
for the helped person was more likely than by chance, and that helping therefore had a 
considerable effect.  
We ran a series of five rounds of the baseline condition with each subject, followed by a 
series of five rounds of the emergency condition (see Materials and Methods). The two 
conditions were presented to subjects in the same order. The purpose of this fixed-order 
design is to control for order effects: People facing emergency situations after a series of 
baseline situations might react differently than when the order is reversed. In order to stay as 
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close as possible to the naturally occurring sequence of cooperation in daily-life situations, 
we chose to study situations where the emergency condition follows a series of baseline 
situations, rather than the opposite. As a side effect, our results are only valid in situations 
where this order of events apply, or under the assumption that the order effect is negligible. 
In addition, we measured the subjects’ social value orientation (SVO) — a standardized 
measure of the magnitude of the concern people have for others. We used the newly 
developed (SVO) Slider Measure described by Murphy et al.29,a six-items resource 
allocation task distinguishing altruistic, prosocial, individualistic, and competitive tendencies. 
The focal subject’s decisions in the game and the results of the SVO test affected real other 
participants who actually received a monetary bonus or penalty depending on the focal 
subject’s decisions. Subjects were informed of this payment scheme in advance; the 
behaviour we observed therefore had real and not just hypothetical consequences.  
 
 
Results 
 
We first evaluated variability of behaviours across the five rounds of each condition. A one-
way ANOVA indicated no significant differences across the rounds with regard to the number 
of people helped in the baseline condition, F(4, 515) = 0.04, p = .99, or the emergency 
condition, F(4, 515) = 0.17, p = .95. We therefore used the mean value of help provided over 
the five rounds for each subject and condition in all subsequent analyses. 
 
Aggregate level. The degree of cooperation was evaluated by means of two different 
measures, which we call the outcome level and the process level. At the outcome level, 
cooperation 𝐶! is measured by looking at the number of participants in need who were 
helped by the focal subject. At the process level, cooperation 𝐶! is evaluated by looking at 
how much risk the subjects took to help others, that is, 𝐶! = 1 − 𝑝(𝑡!), where 𝑡! is the time at 
which the focal subject left the setting. The outcome and process levels are not exactly 
equivalent: For example, a subject may want to help five individuals no matter how much risk 
is involved, or to exit the setting when their chance of success equals 50%, no matter how 
many people have been helped. The number of people helped (outcome) does not always 
match the risk taken (process), especially if too much time has been spent on motor actions 
or lost to thinking delays and hesitation.  
Figure 1 shows the cumulative probability distributions for all experimental subjects at the 
outcome and process levels, and for both conditions. Subjects helped significantly fewer 
people in the emergency condition than in the baseline condition (a two-sample t-test 
revealed a statistically significant difference with p = 0.034). In the baseline condition, 
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subjects helped on average 3.71 (SD = 2.11) people, and in the emergency condition, 3.11 
(SD = 2.01) people. At the process level, however, no difference was detected (p = 0.93; 
two-sample t-test). On average subjects in the baseline condition gave 42.8% (SD=22.56) of 
their chance of success to help others; subjects in the emergency condition gave 43.1% 
(SD=25.35).  
What is the origin of this discrepancy between the outcome level (subjects help fewer 
people) and the process level (subjects take the same risk to help others)? As we 
hypothesized earlier, this difference can be explained by processing time. Figure 2 shows 
the absolute and effective processing time under both conditions. The processing time is 
defined as the total time spent in the setting during which the subject was not helping 
another person. It covers delays caused by the motor actions of moving the mouse and 
clicking on buttons, as well as thinking and hesitation time. The absolute time is measured in 
seconds, whereas the effective time is measured in terms of lost chances to succeed and 
corresponds to the absolute time multiplied the probability decay 𝛾. As shown in Figure 2, 
subjects actually reacted faster and/or spent less time thinking about their next action in the 
emergency condition (black bars). However, this increased processing speed was not 
sufficient to compensate the increased time pressure of the environment. In fact, the 
effective time has almost doubled in the emergency condition (Figure 2).  
From this first series of results, we can picture the mechanisms operating at the aggregate 
level: On average, subjects gave approximately 40% of their chance of success to help other 
participants and tried to apply this strategy in both environments. In the baseline condition, 
participants needed on average 3.5 seconds for the processing time corresponding to 6% of 
their chance (because the probability decay is 1.5% per second in this condition). Therefore, 
among the 42.8% chance that participants gave for cooperation, only 36.8% were effectively 
used for helping. Consistently, participants managed to help on average 3.71 persons in this 
condition. In the emergency condition, participants maintained the same intention to 
cooperate: they gave 43.1% of their chance to help others and used on average 1.8 seconds 
for the processing time. However, the probability decay is faster in the emergency condition 
(i.e., 6.5% per second). Consequently, their processing time corresponded to 12% of their 
chance. Therefore, among the 43.1% chance that participants gave for cooperation, only 
31.1% were effectively used for helping. Consistently, participants only managed to help 
3.11 persons in emergency. The results of the intermediate conditions shown in the 
supplementary information also exhibit the same pattern. Therefore, it appears that subjects 
helped less in the emergency condition, but this difference was mostly due to changes in the 
environmental conditions rather than to an actual decay of the helping intentions.  
The fact that subjects left the setting with a 60% chance of success (i.e., gave 40% of their 
chance of success to help others) coincides with the game parameter 𝑝! = 0.6, 
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corresponding to the success probability of helped individuals. The most likely interpretation 
of this similarity is that subjects tended to apply an egalitarian strategy, whereby they were 
willing to cede part of their initial chance of success to align it with the group’s probability of 
success. In other words, subjects helped as many others as they could until their own 
chance of success was equal to that of the people they helped.  
 
Individual level. In addition to aggregate trends, we examined behavioural changes at the 
individual level. Personal SVO scores were calculated according to the procedure described 
in 29. On average, subjects scored 30.37° (SD = 12.16). Based on their scores, subjects 
were categorized into one of four groups defined in Murphy et al.29: 1 subject was classified 
as having an altruist profile (defined as SVO° > 57.15); 77 subjects, a prosocial profile 
(defined as 22.45 < SVO° < 57.15); 26 subjects, an individualistic profile (defined as -12.04 < 
SVO° < 22.45), and none a competitive profile (defined as SVO° < -12.04). As only one 
subject was categorized as an altruist and none as a competitor, we analysed group 
differences in cooperation between subjects with a prosocial and an individualistic profile 
(independent-samples t-test). Cooperation in the low-stress conditions was significantly 
higher for prosocial individuals (M = 4.31, SD = 1.91) than for individualists (M = 1.99, SD = 
1.71), p < .001. The same applied to the emergency condition (prosocials: M = 3.72, SD = 
1.87; individualists M = 1.35, SD = 1.24; p < .001). The results of our experiment are 
therefore consistent with the standardized measure of SVO, indicating that our setup 
captures some basic components of human cooperative behaviour. 
We then examined change in individual subjects’ cooperation between the baseline and 
emergency conditions. For this, we focus on process level cooperation, that is, how much of 
their success chance they gave for helping others. In such as way, we highlight changes in 
the participants’ helping intentions, controlling for the side effects of the increased time 
pressure. To this end, we measured the normalized change 𝛿 between cooperation at the 
process level 𝐶!! in the baseline condition and cooperation at the process level 𝐶′! in the 
emergency condition, for each individual:  𝛿 = (𝐶′! − 𝐶!! ) / 𝑑  
Here, 𝑑 is a normalization factor that is set to 𝑑 = 𝐶!! if 𝐶′! < 𝐶!!, and 𝑑 = (1 − 𝐶!!) if 𝐶′! >𝐶!!. The normalization reflects the fact that the change 𝛿 is measured relatively to how much 
change is possible given the baseline level of cooperation 𝐶!!. Figure 3 shows the observed 
values of 𝛿 for all subjects as a function of their baseline cooperation 𝐶!!. As expected, the 
split between the individualists (in red) and the prosocials (in blue) is clearly visible along the 
x-axis: the majority of individualists exhibited a lower cooperation level than the prosocials. 
The figure also reveals an important variability in how each individual reacted in the 
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emergency condition. Among the subjects who provided little help in the baseline condition, 
some provided more help in the emergency conditions (quadrant A), while others provided 
even less (quadrant C). Likewise, among the subjects who provided a lot of help in the 
baseline condition, some provided less in emergency (quadrant D), while others provided 
even more (quadrant B). Overall, however, the baseline cooperation level 𝐶!! significantly 
correlates with the magnitude of change 𝛿 (R = 0.24, p = 0.01, irrespective of the SVO 
category). That is, subjects who provided more help in the baseline condition tended to 
increase their help under emergency, while those who provided little help in the baseline 
condition tended to decrease their help under emergency. Hence, the emergency condition 
tended to amplify the subjects’ initial cooperative tendencies. As Figure 4 shows, this trend 
is also visible when subjects were grouped according to their SVO profiles. In emergencies, 
the majority of individualists (52%) reduced their cooperation level, while 44% of the 
prosocials increased theirs (Figure 4A). Furthermore, a Kruskal-Wallis test comparing the 
full distributions of change 𝛿 between prosocials and individualists yields a p-value of .0046 
confirming the above tendency (Figure 4B). This emergency-induced amplification of the 
cooperation profiles was not detectable at the aggregate level due to the moderate intensity 
of this tendency combined with the fact that the changes of prosocials and individualists 
tended to cancel each other out at the global level. 
 
Discussion 
 
The help-or-escape game is a multi-player framework in which subjects decide how much 
risk they are willing to take in order to help other participants in anonymous, unidirectional, 
one-shot interactions. The game mimics social dilemmas that typically occur in collective 
emergency situations, using probability rates instead of fixed numbers to indicate expected 
outcomes. The game parameters allow a variety of situations to be implemented and various 
factors potentially influencing cooperation to be evaluated, such as time pressure, risk 
magnitude, group size, utility of the help provided, and cost of helping. In the present 
definition of the framework, we chose to keep the structure of the game as simple as 
possible. Nevertheless, numerous extensions can be considered in future improvements. 
For example, competitive behaviours could be implemented, allowing subjects to harm other 
participants to increase their own chance of success; alternatively, several players could be 
active at the same time, opening up a range of issues related to bystander effects, social 
influence, and diffusion of responsibility with regard to helping people in need30,31. 
As a starting point, we examined behavioural differences between a baseline condition 
imitating situations often encountered in daily life, and a high-risk situation imitating 
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exceptional emergency events. The main differences between the two conditions were (1) 
the increased time pressure, and (2) the nature of the risk, which changed from the gain to 
the loss domain. We purposely exposed our participants to the baseline condition first 
followed by the emergency condition after. The order in which the conditions were presented 
was identical for all the participants. The purpose of this fixed-order design was to control for 
possible order effects: People exposed to an increasing level of emergency might react 
differently than those exposed to a decreasing level of emergency. For example, people who 
experience high-stress situations in their daily life, such as populations living in war zones, 
might develop cooperation strategies that are adapted to the situations they encounter most 
frequently, and thus react differently to environmental changes. To control for this 
hypothetical order effect, we chose to study only the specific situations where emergency 
situations follow a series of non-emergency situations, because this order is arguably closer 
(although not identical) to daily-life situations than the opposite order. Our results and 
conclusions, therefore, are only valid given this specific order of events, or assuming a 
negligible order effect. Beside, we provide additional results in the supplementary 
information showing that habituation effects did not affect our experimental results (Figure 
S2).  
Our results show that subjects tended to help less in the emergency condition than in the 
baseline condition. However, this decrease was not due a reduced intention to cooperate. In 
fact, subjects took as much risk to help others in both conditions, but the increased time 
pressure in the emergency condition did not allow them to help as many others as in the 
baseline condition. The amount of risk that subjects took in each condition (approximately 
40%) suggests that they were relying on an egalitarian heuristic33. That is, they helped 
others until their own chances of success were equal to those of the people they were 
helping.  
This mechanism can produce counterintuitive results. An individual may maintain the same 
helping intention in the emergency condition or even increase it, but end up helping fewer 
people. For instance, suppose that an individual is willing to give 40% of his or her success 
chance for helping others, and needs 2 seconds of processing time. In the baseline 
condition, the time pressure is low and the probability decay is approximately 1.5% chance 
per second. Therefore, 2 seconds of processing time correspond to a loss of 3% success 
chance. Among the 40% chance that the individual is willing to give, 3% are lost and 37% 
will be effectively dedicated to help, which correspond to an average of 3.7 persons helped. 
In the emergency condition, however, the 2 seconds of processing time correspond to a loss 
of 12% success chance because the probability decay rate is approximately 6.5% chance 
per second in this condition. Thus, among the fixed 40% chance that the individual is willing 
to give, only 28% will be effectively dedicated to the help, which correspond to an average of 
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2.8 persons helped. Therefore, the same intention to help in both conditions results in fewer 
people being helped in the emergency condition. In fact, the individual would need to 
increase his or her helping intention up to 52% only to counteract the effect of the increased 
time pressure. In our experiment, participants tended to maintain the same intention to help 
across conditions at the aggregate level, which resulted in fewer people being helped. The 
observed decay of cooperation thus results from a mechanical side effect of the increased 
time pressure, rather than behavioural change32.  
In the literature on human cooperation, the social heuristic hypothesis suggests that intuitive 
and fast decisions promote cooperation 24. People are therefore expected to cooperate more 
when time pressure increases, which is not in line with our observation in the HoE game at 
the aggregate level. However, time pressure is not the only factor that changes in 
emergencies. Numerous other features of the environmental structure are also affected, 
ranging from the global context (represented by the framing story we told our subjects), to 
the nature of the risk, which switches from the gain to the loss domain. In this respect, 
prospect theory states that people generally tend to avoid high losses26, which would instead 
lead to a decrease in cooperation in our setup. It is therefore difficult to map theoretical 
predictions onto concrete emergency situations due to the large number of co-occurring 
environmental factors. The HoE game makes it possible to decompose these multiple 
influencing elements, and thus to understand the complex mechanisms operating in 
emergency situations. 
Although the helping intention remains unchanged at the aggregate level, our results show 
that individuals responded to emergencies in different ways offset each other at the 
aggregate level. In particular, we found that individual cooperation profiles tended to become 
more extreme under emergency. This observation is partly in line with a recent in-depth 
study of spontaneous cooperation34, which demonstrated that prosocial individuals increased 
their level of cooperation under time pressure, but individualists did not. Our findings confirm 
these results and also show the symmetric effect, namely, that individualists reduce their 
level of cooperation in emergencies. Emergencies therefore seem to amplify people’s natural 
cooperation tendency. This interpretation of our results is generally consistent with the 
picture emerging from recent research on human cooperation22,23. 
In conclusion, the help-or-escape framework offers new research opportunities and can be 
used to experimentally address numerous issues related to cooperation in collective 
emergencies. The HoE game can therefore help to advance research on crowd 
management and issues related to human cooperation in general. 
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Materials and Methods 
Experimental procedure. Data were collected in Berlin, Germany, between July 1st and 
July 31st, 2015. A total of 104 participants were recruited for the study (47% male, 𝑀!"# =24.9 years). The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Max Planck Institute for 
Human Development. All methods were performed in accordance with the approved 
guidelines. All participants gave informed consent to the experimental procedure. The 
experiment was computer-based; participants were seated in front of a computer screen for 
the duration of the experiment. Each participant played the role of the focal subject for 5 
repetitions of each of the three following conditions: the baseline condition (𝛼 = 1;  𝛽 =0;  𝜏 = 60𝑠), an intermediate condition (𝛼 = 0;  𝛽 = −1;  𝜏 = 30𝑠), and the emergency 
condition (𝛼 = 0;  𝛽 = −4;  𝜏 = 15𝑠). The three conditions were presented in this order. The 
results from the intermediate condition did not differ from those of the baseline condition and 
are not reported in this article. The other parameters of the game remained unchanged 
across conditions, as shown in Table 1. For each condition, we first exposed the subject to a 
framing story and explained the rules of the game. After correctly answering three 
comprehension questions, subjects did a practice trial and finally played 5 consecutive 
rounds with the same game parameters. This process was repeated for all three conditions. 
After the third condition, subjects entered some personal demographic information and 
completed a Social Value Orientation (SVO) measurement using the SVO Slider test 
described in Murphy et al.29. In that test, participants made six unilateral decisions about the 
allocation of resources between themselves and another person. In each of the six items, 
participants were confronted with a continuum of payoffs for themselves ranging from 50 to 
100 cents. Each of these payoffs was associated to a payoff for another person ranging from 
15 to 100 cents. Participants had to choose which pair of payoffs they prefer. The exact 
payoff values for each item were determined and calibrated in Murphy et al.29. Finally, 
subjects were paid and dismissed. 
 
Payment. Participants received a starting capital of 14 euros at the beginning of the 
experiment, and were informed that this amount would increase or decrease depending on 
the outcome of the experiment. Participants were explicitly informed that their chance to 
receive the bonus 𝛼 and avoid the penalty 𝛽 in each round decreased continuously as long 
as they did not decide to escape by pressing a button. At the end of the experiment, we 
randomly selected one round from each condition, and one decision in the SVO test. The 
total monetary payoff for those selected items was then determined and added to the 
subject’s starting capital. This could result in an increase or a decrease of the starting 
capital, depending on the decisions made by the subject. The subject also passively played 
the role of one of the 𝑁 individuals in need of the previous experimental session. That is, we 
randomly selected one of the 𝑁 individuals in need for each condition of subject 𝑖 − 1, and 
transferred the corresponding payoff to the capital of subject 𝑖. Thus, the decision made by 
each participant affected the outcome of the next one. Participants were informed about this 
procedure. The payoff inherited from the previous participant was only made known to the 
subject at the very end of the experiment to ensure that the subject’s behaviour was not 
influenced by direct or indirect reciprocity. 
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Experimental software. In each round, time was symbolized on the screen by an arrow that 
continuously moved down a vertical scale ranging from 100% (top) to 0% (bottom). The 
speed of the arrow was calibrated on the value of 𝜏 in each condition such that participants 
had a visual representation of the time pressure. In addition, in the emergency condition, a 
red blinking frame was added to the screen to emphasize the alarming atmosphere. The 
number of participants in need 𝑁 was represented by a set of 𝑁 stylized illustrations of 
people. Every time the subject decided to help someone, one of these illustrations was 
automatically removed from the set to show how many more people could be helped. 
Subjects indicated their decision to help or to leave the setting by clicking on a respectively 
labelled button. When subjects decided to help, both buttons were disabled during the 
helping time, corresponding to a loss of 𝑝! chances to succeed.  
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Figure legends and tables 
 
 
Parameter  Description Baseline 
condition 
Emergency 
condition 𝛼 Success bonus +1 0 𝛽 Failure penalty 0 - 4 𝜏 Duration of the game 60 seconds 15 seconds 𝑵 Number of participants in need 8 8 𝒑𝒉 Success probability for non-
helped participants in need 0.1 0.1 𝒑′𝒉 Success probability for helped 
participants in need 0.6 0.6 𝒑𝒄 Cost of helping for the focal 
subject 0.1 0.1 
 
Table 1: Description of the game parameters and values implemented in the baseline and 
the emergency conditions.   
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Figure 1: Experimental results. Cumulative probability distributions of the degree of 
cooperation observed in the baseline condition (in blue) and the emergency condition (in 
red), for all 104 participants. In (A), cooperation 𝐶! is measured at the outcome level, that is, 
in terms of how many participants the subject helped before leaving the setting. In (B), 
cooperation 𝐶! is measured at the process level, that is, in terms of how much risk was 
taken to help others (irrespective of how many people were helped). While no significant 
difference was observed at the process level, the level of cooperation was significantly lower 
under emergency conditions at the outcome level.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Processing time. Average time spent in the game setting without helping 
anybody under baseline (in black) and emergency (in grey) conditions, for all 104 
participants. The absolute time is measured in seconds, whereas the effective time is 
measured in terms of lost chances to escape. Errors bars indicate the standard deviation of 
the mean. While subjects tended to react faster in the emergency condition, the effective 
processing time doubled. Chances decreased at a rate of approximately 1.5% per second 
under baseline conditions, and 6.5% per second under emergency conditions. 
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Figure 3: Emergency-induced behavioural changes. Individual changes in cooperation 
between the normal and the emergency conditions for all 104 participants. The baseline 
level represents how much help was given under normal conditions; the behavioural change 
indicates whether that subject gave more or less help in the emergency condition 
(normalized by the amount of possible increase or decrease). Red and blue dots indicate 
subjects classified as individualists and prosocials, respectively, as measured by their SVO. 
The quadrants (A-D) indicate whether subjects initially helped little (A,C) or a lot (B,D), and 
whether subjects increased (A,B) or decreased (C,D) their help under emergency conditions.  
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Figure 4: Behavioural changes induced by the emergency condition among the participants 
classified as prosocials (n=77) and individualists (n=26). (A) The grey bars indicate the 
proportion of individuals in each category who increased their help in the emergency 
condition (𝛿 > 0.1), and the black bars indicate the proportion of those who decreased their 
help (𝛿 < −0.1). The proportion of participants who did not change their help (−0.1 ≤ 𝛿 ≤0.1) is not shown. The majority of prosocials (44%) increased their help during emergency 
whereas the majority of individualists (52%) decreased their help. (B) Boxplots comparing 
the full distributions of change 𝛿 for the prosocials and individualists. A Kruskal-Wallis test 
indicates a significant difference between prosocials and individualists (p = .0046). 
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